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Including Post-Acute Care Services
LAURA A. DUMMIT, Principal Policy Analyst
OVERVIEW — Fee-for-service Medicare, in which a separate 
payment is made for each service, rewards health care providers 
for delivering more services, but not necessarily coordinating 
those services over time or across settings. To help address these 
concerns, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 
2010 requires Medicare to experiment with making a bundled 
payment for a hospitalization plus post-acute care, that is, the 
recuperative or rehabilitative care following a hospital dis-
charge. This bundled payment approach is intended to promote 
more efficient care across the acute/post-acute episode because 
the entity that receives the payment has financial incentives to 
keep episode costs below the payment. Although the entity is 
expected to control costs through improved care coordination 
and efficiency, it could stint on care or avoid expensive patients 
instead. This issue brief focuses on the unique challenges posed 
by the inclusion of post-acute care services in a payment bundle 
and special considerations in implementing and evaluating the 
episode payment approach.
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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA)1 includes a Medicare pilot program to test 
whether bundling the payments for a hospitalization and 
subsequent post-acute care (PAC) can “improve the coordi-
nation, quality, and efficiency of health care services.” The 
law outlines general parameters of the pilot: for beneficiaries 
with designated conditions, Medicare would pay an entity 
for covered services, including inpatient hospital, physician, 
outpatient therapy, and post-acute care services delivered 
during an episode of care that is initiated with a hospitaliza-
tion and continues for 30 days after discharge (Figure 1). The 
pilot, slated to start by 2013, will be evaluated on whether it 
improved quality of care, health outcomes, and access, and 
whether it reduced spending.2 The stakes are high for this 
pilot, because if it is successful it could be expanded in the 
Medicare program without any additional legislative action.
A bundled payment approach aims to improve care coordination 
and to control the cost of an episode of care by changing provid-
ers’ financial incentives. Under fee-for-service payments, providers 
FIGURE 1: National Medicare Bundling Pilot




Applicable condition is one 
or more of ten conditions 
selected by the Secretary
Episode of Care
Three days prior to hospitalization 
for an applicable condition
Source: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), §3023, National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling, pp. 302–307.
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are rewarded for delivering more services, without regard for the 
need for those services, and no entity is responsible for ensuring the 
efficient delivery of services across providers. By making a single 
payment to one entity, bundling makes that entity responsible for all 
services required for the entire episode. The entity would arrange 
for the array of acute and post-acute care services to be available and 
would apportion the bundled payment to providers, including phy-
sicians, hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, and home health agen-
cies, involved in the patient’s care.
The primary financial incentive under bundling is to reduce the 
costs of care provided during the episode because the entity receiv-
ing the payment would keep any difference between the payment 
and episode costs; conversely, it would be responsible for any costs 
above the payment amount. The entity could reduce costs by elimi-
nating unnecessary services delivered during the episode, avoid-
ing hospital readmissions, coordinating services across all provid-
ers and facilities to avoid duplication and waste, and delivering 
the most efficient mix of services for the patient. Alternatively, the 
entity could reduce costs by stinting on care or avoiding high cost 
patients. The design of the pilot and the safeguards and oversight 
incorporated into the program will determine whether the intent of 
bundling is achieved.
BACKGROUND
The Secretary of Health and Human Services will specify the re-
quirements of the bundling pilot, including designating the medical 
conditions that could be subject to the bundled payment (Figure 2, 
see next page). Entities that want to participate in the pilot by re-
ceiving the bundled payment in return for delivering the bundled 
services will propose the details of their particular approach. It is 
anticipated that health care or hospital systems will apply to par-
ticipate in the pilot as entities that receive the bundled payment. Al-
though the law included general descriptions of the services covered 
under the bundle and the time frame that defines the episode, many 
factors could differ across pilot projects. The criteria for choosing 
which entities will participate and the methods for evaluating the 
pilot remain to be specified. It is not yet known how directive the 
Secretary will be and how much flexibility entities will have in de-
veloping their approaches.
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POST-ACUTE CARE
Post-acute care includes the recuperation, rehabilitation, and nurs-
ing services following a hospitalization that are provided in skilled 
nursing facilities (SNFs), inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRFs), 
and long-term care hospitals (LTCHs), and by home health agencies 
(HHAs) and outpatient rehabilitation providers (see text box, next 
page). Medicare payments have increased rapidly to these provid-
ers. The most recent data indicates that spending on post-acute care 
increased an average of 9 percent per year from 2000 to 2007 and 
slowed to almost 6 percent per year in 2008 and 2009, which is still 
considerably higher than the growth in overall health care costs.3
Charac teris tic s  of Providers
There is considerable overlap in the types of services provided in 
the various PAC sites.4 In general, LTCHs are the most expensive set-
ting and provide care to the most clinically complex patients. IRFs 
FIGURE 2: National Medicare Bundling Pilot
Definition 
of an Episode 
(Bundle)
• Three days prior to a hospitalization for an applicable condition, the hospitalization, 
through 30 days post-hospital discharge
• Applicable condition is one or more of 10 conditions selected by the Secretary
• Inpatient hospital services, physician services, outpatient hospital services, home health 
care, skilled nursing care, inpatient rehabilitation facility services, long-term care 
hospital services
Payment • Comprehensive payment for all applicable services
• Made to the entity participating in the pilot program
• The Secretary shall develop payment methods, which may include bundled payments or 
bids from pilot participants
Accountability • Quality measures established by the Secretary to include: functional status, avoidable 
hospital readmissions, community discharge, emergency room use, provider-acquired 
infections, efficiency, patient-centeredness, patient perception of care, other measures in- 
cluding outcomes as appropriate
• Quality measures for episodes of care and for post-acute care
• Requirements that the entities participating in the pilot ensure an adequate choice of 
providers and suppliers
Source: PPACA §3023, National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling, pp. 302–307.
www.nhpf.org
5
I S S U E  B R I E F
NO. 841
Medicare Post-Acute Care Providers: Number, Growth, and Payments
Long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) are certified as hospitals, meeting the same minimum staffing requirements, 
range of services, and life-safety standards. In addition, LTCHs are required to have an average Medicare 
length of stay of more than 25 days, which is intended to ensure that their patients are medically complex. 
LTCHs that are located within an acute care hospital—the fastest growing segment of these providers—are 
subject to additional requirements that limit the share of their patients admitted from the host hospital. The 
number of LTCHs rose from 278 in 2001 to 432 in 2009, although they are still not available in most areas 
of the country. In areas with no LTCH, acute care hospitals and SNFs substitute. The number of Medicare 
fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries treated in LTCHs continues to increase, as have average per-case pay-
ments, reaching over $35,000 per stay. Of all post-acute care providers, LTCHs treat the fewest number of 
Medicare beneficiaries (37.7 per 10,000 FFS beneficiaries in 2008), however, their rapid growth and high cost 
have raised concerns about their impact on Medicare spending.
Inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRFs) must meet all acute care hospital conditions of participation plus ad-
ditional criteria related to the ability to provide intensive rehabilitation. The number of patients treated in 
IRFs grew rapidly between 2002 and 2004 to reach 124.9 FFS beneficiaries per 10,000 after implementation 
of a prospective, per-case payment method. Medicare patients then fell steadily to 95.6 per 10,000 by 2008, 
which was expected as a result of enforcement of the 60 percent rule. This rule, or compliance threshold, 
requires 60 percent of cases at a Medicare-certified IRF to be in 1 of 13 diagnoses specified by Medicare. 
Patients with these diagnoses typically require the level of rehabilitation provided at IRFs. The average 
Medicare payment per case reached $16,649 in 2008.
Skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) are the most numerous post-acute care provider, with 15,000 facilities in 2009. 
The majority of SNFs also are licensed as nursing homes to provide long-term support services, which 
are not covered by Medicare. SNFs have been providing a higher intensity of rehabilitation services to 
Medicare patients in recent years. Although this might reflect changes in patient need, many believe it is 
a consequence of Medicare payment policy changes that reward the provision of more therapy services 
to patients needing rehabilitation. Medicare admissions per 10,000 FFS beneficiaries were 740 in 2008, up 
from 670 per 10,000 in 2004.
Home health agencies (HHAs) provide the least intensive services and are often used after a patient has 
been treated in another post-acute care site. Further, approximately half of Medicare patients in HHAs 
are admitted from the community; that is, they have not had a prior hospital stay that triggered their need 
for home health services. The number of HHAs has grown rapidly, from 7,061 in 2001 to 10,422 in 2009. 
Beginning in 2000, home health visits were bundled for a single payment for a 60-day episode of care. This 
payment change was implemented in response to rapid increases in the number of home health visits and 
Medicare spending. The growth in home health spending slowed temporarily as a result of Medicare pay-
ment changes, but by 2009 it had increased to previous levels, topping 18 percent growth from 2008. At 
the same time, the number of visits provided to each home health patient dropped by almost one half. In 
2008, 9.1 percent of Medicare beneficiaries used home health care, with 37 visits per user and an average 
payment of $2,786 per episode.
Source: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), A Data Book: Healthcare Spending and the Medicare Program, 
June 2010, available at www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun10DataBookEntireReport.pdf.
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generally treat patients who need more rehabilitation than patients 
who are admitted to a SNF, and the IRF patients must be healthy 
enough to participate in intensive therapy. In aggregate, SNFs pro-
vide fewer hours of therapy than IRFs and have a less skilled staffing 
configuration, with less physician involvement and lower nurse-to-
patient ratios.5 HHAs provide rehabilitation or skilled nursing care 
in the homes of patients who are unable to leave without assistance. 
Over half of home health episodes are not initiated after a hospital 
stay. HHA payments tend to be the lowest among the providers, re-
flecting their less extensive services.
Although the Medicare program has different coverage criteria, 
facility requirements, and payment methods for each post-acute 
care setting (Figure 3), policymakers remain concerned about the 
lack of clear distinctions in services and expertise across providers, 
particularly given the significant differences in payment amounts. 
FIGURE 3
Medicare Post-Acute Care Coverage Requirements: Patients, Facilities, and Services
PROVIDER TYPE Patient Requirements Facility Requirements Services
Home Health 
Agency (HHA)
Home-bound, need skilled 
nursing care on a part-time or 
intermittent basis
N/A
Skilled nursing care;  
physical, occupational, and 
speech therapy; medical social 
work; home health aide
Skilled Nursing 
Facility (SNF)
Need short-term skilled 
nursing or rehabilitation 
services on an inpatient basis 
after a hospital stay of at least 
three days
N/A





Must need intensive 
rehabilitation therapy and be 
able to tolerate and benefit 
from three hours or more of 
therapy a day
At least 60 percent of the 
facility’s patients have one 
of several specific medical 
conditions that require 
inpatient therapy
Intensive inpatient physical, 





Clinically complex problems Average Medicare length of stay greater than 25 days
Acute care inpatient hospital 
services
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According to the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (Med-
PAC) “PAC [post-acute care] settings lack clear boundaries around 
the services furnished and the types of patients treated…. Yet, the 
setting where a patient is treated has very different cost implications 
for the program (and for the beneficiary, through the copayments).”6
Use of Post-Acute Care
Post-acute care use varies widely across individuals with similar 
conditions and can follow numerous patterns. The choice of post-
acute setting may be based on ownership or contracting relation-
ships of the discharging hospital. Further, LTCHs and IRFs are not 
located in all geographic areas, so they are not options for a large 
number of patients. Decisions may also hinge on the patient’s liv-
ing situation. A patient who does not have support in the home, for 
example, may not be able to be discharged from the hospital with 
home health care.
For some patients, care may proceed from a more intensive to a less 
intensive site, for example from an IRF to home health care, as treat-
ment progresses. Other patients may be discharged from a hospital 
to a SNF for recuperative care 
and then proceed to an IRF for 
more rehabilitation. Many post-
acute care episodes are punctu-
ated by a return to the acute care 
hospital, which may be one of 
the most expensive components 
of an episode. 
Based on an examination of post-
acute care use conducted for the 
Assistant Secretary for Planning 
and Evaluation (ASPE), in 2006, 
over 14 percent of Medicare fee-
for-service (FFS) beneficiaries 
had an index hospitalization, 
which was defined as one follow-
ing 60 days without an inpatient 
stay or post-acute care services.7 
Of these beneficiaries, just over 
35 percent were discharged to 
Readmission Policy Changes
The bundling pilot outlined in PPACA is one of several approaches to 
slowing spending growth that are being implemented or tested in the 
Medicare program. Another option focuses on reducing avoidable hospital 
readmissions of Medicare patients. Beginning in 2012,* Medicare will iden-
tify hospitals that have “excess” readmissions for specified conditions or 
procedures and then penalize them by reducing their Medicare payments. 
By targeting the hospital payment, the hospital is held responsible for what 
happens after the patient is discharged. Like a bundled payment approach, 
this new readmission policy is intended to provide incentives for consider-
ing care consequences beyond each institution’s walls. In response to this 
policy change, hospitals are expected to improve discharge planning or 
other activities, like coordinating care with physicians and post-acute care 
providers, which will minimize readmissions.‡
* Fiscal years beginning on or after October 1, 2012.
‡ Deborah Peikes et al., “Effects of Care Coordination on Hospitalization, Quality of Care, 
and Health Care Expenditures Among Medicare Beneficiaries: 15 Randomized Trials,” Jour-
nal of the American Medical Association, 301, no. 6 (2009): pp. 603–618, available at 
http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/301/6/603.full.
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post-acute care for further treatment. Most beneficiaries received 
their post-acute care in SNFs (41.4 percent) or through home health 
(37.4 percent); the rest were treated in an IRF (10.3 percent) or with 
hospital outpatient therapy (9.1 percent), and a small share received 
care in a LTCH (2 percent). The proportions of patients who used 
post-acute care varied based on the cause of the index hospitaliza-
tion. The majority (87.3 percent) of patients hospitalized for a major 
joint procedure,8 for example, used post-acute services, with consid-
erable variation in the site of care (Figure 4). Moreover, Medicare’s 
payments for the care of these patients differed as well. Of the pa-
tients hospitalized for stroke,9 58.1 percent received post-acute care, 
with about one-third admitted to an IRF, another third to a SNF, and 
about 20 percent to home health.
Generally, the higher the severity and cost of the index hospitaliza-
tion, the more expensive the post-acute service use. The mean total 
payment (the initial admission plus post-acute use until there was a 
60-day period without service use) was $23,985 for post-acute users 
following a major joint procedure (DRG 544).10 Payments for beneficia-
ries who had no comorbid or complicating conditions (one measure 
Patients Hospitalized with Pneumonia, 2006 (DRG 089, Simple Pneumonia and Pleurisy Age > 17 with complication or comorbity)
Discharged to: 
Patients Hospitalized with Joint Replacement, 2006 (DRG 544, Major Joint Replacement or Reattachment of Lower Extremity)
Discharged to: 
Note: Not all patterns of care following a hospitalization are shown.
Source: Author's calculations using data from Barbara Gage et al., “Examining Post Acute Care Relationships in an Integrated Hospital System: 
Final Report,” Report to the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE), Department of Health and Human Services, RTI International, 
Project Number 0208820.002.001, February 2009, available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/09/pacihs/index.shtml.
FIGURE 4: Selected Patterns of Care for Medicare Beneficiaries
Home, No  
Post-Acute Care
Home Health  
Only




SNF then  
Home Health
Percent of 
Patients 66.4% 7.8% 4.1% 8.8% 2.9%
Home, No  
Post-Acute Care
Home Health  
Only




SNF then  
Home Health
Percent of 
Patients 12.7% 20.1% 8.9% 7.5% 17.1%
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of severity) averaged $17,724, compared with $35,319 for those with 
five or more conditions. For beneficiaries with an index hospitaliza-
tion for pneumonia (DRG 089), one-third used post-acute care and 
the average episode payment was $20,476, but ranged from $16,096 to 
$23,241, depending on level of severity.
Few conclusions can be drawn from the literature about the most 
effective site or pattern of care, or factors that affect the type and 
amount of service use.11 Research has been limited by the lack of con-
sistent patient assessment measures across settings, including out-
come measures upon discharge. According to MedPAC, “Ideally, a 
common assessment tool would gather uniform information to help 
providers make appropriate placement decisions and enable CMS 
[the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services] to evaluate patient 
outcomes within and across settings.”12 CMS was directed by law 
to develop such a tool for use in all post-acute care sites. The Con-
tinuity Assessment Record and Evaluation (CARE) instrument was 
developed to measure clinical and functional status of patients upon 
hospital discharge and post-acute care admission and discharge.13 So 
far, the CARE instrument has been tested by almost 200 providers; 
an evaluation of the data collected is scheduled for release in 2011.
RESPONSES TO BUNDLING
Patients who require post-acute care services after a hospitalization 
are often beneficiaries with complex needs who receive expensive 
care. Therefore there may be multiple opportunities to better coor-
dinate these services to improve the efficiency of the care over the 
episode. With the financial flexibility of a bundled payment, the 
responsible entity will be able to tailor treatment options to fit the 
specific needs of the patients and to improve transitions among set-
tings. Ostensibly, the bundled payment will encourage physicians 
and other providers to consider the entire period for which the ben-
eficiary will need care, which may suggest ways to shorten stays in 
expensive institutions, like LTCHs or IRFs, and promote other trade-
offs. The lack of clearly preferable treatment options may represent 
the ultimate opportunity for innovation in treatment design.
A bundled payment, however, could also reward some undesirable 
behaviors, such as stinting on care, delaying certain services and 
treatments so that they would be provided outside of the episode, 
or avoiding high-cost patients. The entity that receives the payment 
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would have incentives to reduce services or limit transfers to expen-
sive providers. In this case, the costs of the care covered under the 
bundled payment would indeed be lowered, but the efficiency of 
care would not necessarily be improved. Whether these behaviors 
would have a negative effect on care would be hard to detect because 
standards of post-acute care and outcomes are poorly measured. To 
the extent that such responses would just push services outside of 
the bundle, either by provider or time, they may actually hurt the 
quality of care and increase, rather than decrease, overall costs.
UNIQUE CHALLENGES OF BUNDLING  
POST-ACUTE CARE
The lack of clear clinical indications for post-acute care site or ser-
vices, the characteristics of the overall health care market, and the 
complexity of the patient population are challenges that need to be 
addressed in a bundled payment approach. The addition of post-
acute care services to a hospitalization for a bundled payment will 
complicate efforts to ensure that appropriate services are provided to 
patients, particularly when strong financial incentives reward mini-
mizing service use.
Appropriate Site
There are no widely accepted standards for choice of post-acute care, 
and there is little systematic evidence to indicate which site of post-
acute care or which services are clinically indicated for a patient.14 
Often, the choice of setting is based on availability, proximity, and 
patient preferences. Although these factors need to be considered, 
the dearth of clinical and rehabilitation outcome information may 
result in suboptimal decisions by patients and providers. This infor-
mation gap can leave the Medicare program vulnerable to paying 
too much and the beneficiary vulnerable to inappropriate or inad-
equate care. Because the cost of care across sites varies considerably 
and the services provided in each setting are the same or similar, 
when the situation is ambiguous, the entity receiving the bundled 
payment will favor the site with the lowest net expense.
Ownership or other organizational connections between provid-
ers could strongly influence the choice of post-acute care setting or 
particular provider. Many hospitals own post-acute care providers 
www.nhpf.org
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and that number could grow under the incentives of bundling. In 
2006, close to 13 percent of patients who were discharged to a SNF 
went to a hospital-based provider, about half of hospital discharges 
to an IRF were to a hospital-based provider, and almost 21 percent 
of patients discharged to home health received their care from a 
hospital-based HHA.15 If the payment entity, for example, was a hos-
pital that had a SNF unit, it would strongly prefer to send patients 
needing post-acute care to that SNF. In this way, it would keep more 
of the payment, have better control of costs and occupancy in both 
settings, minimize disruptions for the patient, and have more oppor-
tunities to ensure continuity of care. Although these incentives exist 
under the current payment methods, they would be strengthened 
under a bundled approach. Whether this is 
always consistent with providing quality 
care is not known.
Another factor that affects choice and use 
of post-acute care is that some settings are 
not widely available. The two most expen-
sive, IRFs and LTCHs, are not located in all states or some larger 
regions. In 2007, IRF beds per 1,000 Medicare beneficiaries ranged 
from 1.82 in Arkansas and 2.09 in Louisiana, to 0.19 in Maryland and 
0.30 in Oregon.16 The disparities in the availability of LTCH beds is 
even greater, ranging from 3.08 beds per 1,000 Medicare beneficia-
ries in Louisiana and 3.92 in Massachusetts to none in Alaska, Iowa, 
Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Vermont. This wide 
disparity in availability of providers raises questions about the use 
of post-acute care for beneficiaries in areas without access to IRFs or 
LTCHs. It may complicate efforts to develop an appropriate bundled 
payment amount and evaluate the impact of bundling on spending. 
Freedom of Choice
Whether by ownership or through contractual arrangements, enti-
ties accepting bundled payments will have to develop affiliations 
across providers to deliver all required services, manage the epi-
sode of care, and determine the distribution of the payment. These 
arrangements, in effect, will limit patients’ freedom of choice of 
providers, which has been a basic tenet of Medicare fee-for-service. 
Under Medicare’s managed care option (Medicare Advantage) free-
dom of choice is restricted, but beneficiaries voluntarily enroll in 
The lack of widely accepted standards for post-acute 
care site and service needs will complicate efforts to 
ensure appropriate care during an episode.
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that program. How beneficiary preference or choice of provider 
would be considered under a bundled payment option is not clear, 
nor is it clear whether or how a patient could choose to participate 
in the pilot.
Just as Medicare beneficiaries have freedom to choose their provid-
ers, providers that do not have a contractual arrangement with the 
entity that receives the bundled payment may argue that they should 
be able to participate in the bundling pilot. They may say that the 
entity should take “any willing provider” that accepts the terms and 
conditions offered. Providers may be especially concerned about ex-
clusive relationships developed to accept a bundled payment if they 
are excluded and their market share is threatened. This might par-
ticularly be the case for smaller or independent providers that are 
in markets where a dominant system that can provide the range of 
acute and post-acute services required for the episode receives the 
bundled payment.
OUTCOMES OF CARE
The ability to assess the value of the services is particularly impor-
tant under a bundled arrangement to protect the welfare of the pa-
tient. Patients who use post-acute care often have multiple medical 
needs, use multiple providers, and have multiple episodes of care 
during the year.17 Measures that have been used to assess the effec-
tiveness of post-acute care include return to the community; activi-
ties of daily living; instrumental activities of daily living; function 
related to walking, self-reported health, and satisfaction; rehospital-
izations; and mortality.18 Some of these measures are objective and 
could be adjusted to account for different propensities across patient 
types. Others, however, are at least somewhat subjective and reflect 
social supports as well as the adequacy of rehabilitation or recovery. 
Further, for some elderly patients with chronic conditions, function-
al improvements may not be realistic, and maintenance of condition 
may not be readily achieved either.
In addition, the line between when post-acute care ends and long-
term support services begin is not clear in many cases. Long-term 
support services are oriented to social supports and maintenance 
rather than rehabilitation and recovery. The ability to shift the line 
between post-acute care and long-term support services was ap-
parent when Medicare home health coverage rules were relaxed 
www.nhpf.org
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in 1988 and utilization skyrocketed, which was an indication that 
Medicare’s home health benefit had changed so that it was being 
used to provide long-term supports to beneficiaries.19 The distinction 
between post-acute and long-term support services is particularly 
important because the Medicare program does not pay for long-term 
support services, so the entity receiving the bundled payment will 
have strong incentives to define service needs as long-term support 
services to minimize its financial responsibility.20
DESIGN FEATURES TO ADDRESS  
CONCERNS OF BUNDLING
The design of the bundled payment approach will affect whether 
providers respond with changes that improve the continuity and ef-
ficiency of care.21 The approach needs to incorporate enough flexibil-
ity to allow providers to be creative in adopting new delivery models 
Critical Features of a Bundled Payment
Designation of the entity — The entity that receives the bundled payment is responsible for ensuring that the appropriate 
care is delivered, that providers are paid, and that the care is coordinated. This entity should have the relevant clinical 
expertise, relationships with the necessary providers, and experience managing episodes of care.
Definition of the bundle — The bundle of services and providers covered by the payment would need to be carefully 
delineated to help prevent shifting services and costs out of the bundle. The entity has incentives to lower the costs 
of treating the patient by moving services out of the time frame of the episode or to determine that services are not 
needed. While reducing costs to the entity, this could actually increase program costs and may further fragment care.
Determination of the payment amount and adjustments — The amount of the bundled payment would need to be high enough 
to cover the costs of delivering necessary services efficiently, but also lean enough to exert some pressure on the entity 
to manage the episode. Appropriate adjustments to the payment would be needed to ensure that patients with greater 
needs continue to have access and to help ensure that any savings are not due to stinting on care or “cherry picking” 
less expensive patients.
Measurement of quality and outcomes — The quality and outcomes of care would need to be carefully assessed because the 
entity has incentives to minimize costs, which could be achieved by stinting on necessary care or by substituting less 
expensive treatments that may not be as effective. New measures would need to be developed and tested to ensure 
that quality and outcomes were not diminished. Current measures often merely count the number and type of services 
received by the patient and would not be adequate because the bundled payment is intended to change the delivery of 
care. Particularly challenging will be measures that accurately assess the care to patients who are unlikely to improve.
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and to reward improvements in care coordination and efficiency. At 
the same time, it needs to protect patients from inadequate or inap-
propriate care and protect the Medicare program and beneficiaries 
from paying for services that are not beneficial or not delivered. The 
criteria for designating the payment entity and the bundle defini-
tion, payment amount and adjustments, and outcomes and quality 
measures will determine whether the bundling pilot can promote 
more coordinated, efficient patterns of care. 
Payment Entity
At a minimum, the entity that receives the bundled payment would 
need to be large enough to manage the risk that the payment may 
not cover the costs of care for some patients, to be able to arrange 
for all of the services required by every patient, and to apportion 
the payment across providers. Other requirements likely include 
the ability to manage care, report patient-level data, and ensure the 
quality of care across the entire episode. In many instances, the en-
tity is likely to be a hospital or provider system, which may own 
post-acute care facilities or have other established contractual rela-
tionships with them. Acute care hospitals would be likelier than a 
post-acute care provider or physician practice to have the resources 
and infrastructure to manage this kind of endeavor. An integrated 
delivery system may also have advantages in accepting a bundled 
payment. Stricter requirements for entities with respect to these fac-
tors may provide better assurances of program success, but would 
also restrict the number and type of bundling options that could be 
evaluated.
Recognizing the difficulty of assigning an entity the responsibility 
of coordinating and monitoring the range of services across multiple 
providers and the potential of unintended consequences, MedPAC 
recommended that Medicare pursue bundling in an incremental 
manner.22 It recommended beginning with reduced payments to 
hospitals with high avoidable readmissions, which Medicare is cur-
rently implementing. This essentially makes the hospital account-
able for the quality of the transition out of the hospital, extending its 
responsibility through payment incentives beyond the hospital stay. 
This will allow the Medicare program to assess the use of payment 
incentives to encourage a more collaborative approach to care transi-
tions, and to evaluate how hospitals respond to these incentives.
www.nhpf.org
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Bundle Definition
Critical aspects of the bundle definition have been specified in the 
law, but many decisions remain that will affect the payment incen-
tives. Although almost all Medicare-covered services are included 
in the definition of the bundle, some services could be covered un-
der the bundled payment and others paid separately, depending on 
the need for the particular service. There could be distinctions, for 
example, between services for the condition that caused the hospi-
talization and other services that may be required by the beneficiary 
during the episode period. The entity could be responsible for all 
services necessary to treat the designated condition; other necessary 
services would be paid for separately. A further distinction could be 
made between services for chronic conditions, such as arthritis or 
diabetes, and acute conditions like a urinary tract infection or an in-
jury from a fall. Among the acute conditions, some could reasonably 
be expected to be avoided with appropriate medical care, and others 
may be unavoidable.
Distinguishing between related and unrelated services may not 
be straightforward. When a hospitalization is for a planned event, 
such as a knee replacement, for example, it may be easier to make 
this distinction than for an unplanned admission, like for treatment 
of a stroke. Similarly, services associated with an acute event, such 
as a fall or accident, may be easier to distinguish from services as-
sociated with the episode than services related to chronic condi-
tions such as arthritis or diabetes. With any definition, however, the 
entity that receives the payment has strong incentives to exclude 
services from the bundle and the payer, in this case Medicare, has 
incentives to be inclusive with services. The distinctions between 
the services and treatments related to the acute/post-acute episode 
and other conditions may have a large effect on the costs under the 
episode payment and the assignment of the responsibility for man-
aging health care conditions. 
The more inclusive the bundle definition, the more opportunities 
there would be to substitute across services to improve care and to 
tailor treatment to meet specific clinical or personal needs. If the 
entity was responsible for treating a patient’s chronic conditions 
as well as the condition requiring the hospitalization, it might be 
more likely to coordinate all of the patient’s medications or integrate 
therapies that would be beneficial for coincident conditions, for ex-
ample. With the greater opportunities come greater risks, however. 
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The entity would be at greater financial risk for unexpected or high 
costs associated with the need for particular services. And the pa-
tient would be at greater risk of inadequate or substandard care if an 
entity tried to avoid providing particular services.
One option for defining the bundle for a single payment is a “build-
ing block” approach, in which episode definitions expand as more 
information becomes available.23 Initially, for example, the bundle 
may be the hospital care and the physician services provided dur-
ing the hospital stay. Medicare is currently testing this narrower 
definition of an episode. With more information, the bundle could 
be expanded to include one or more post-acute care services, par-
ticularly for conditions that have a more limited and established 
pattern of care.
Payment Amounts
The payment amount for the bundle of services needs to be set ap-
propriately to reward entities that deliver an episode of care effi-
ciently and provide incentives for improvement. If the payment is 
too low, participation may be limited and any entity that does par-
ticipate will have stronger incentives to stint on services or avoid 
potentially high-cost patients. If the payment is too high, Medicare 
and the beneficiaries will be paying too much and the entity will 
not need to implement the desired efficiencies. The bundle definition 
and other features of the pilot will affect the appropriate level of the 
payment amount.
Medicare typically has used national average provider costs as a 
proxy for the costs of an efficient provider when it sets prospective 
payment rates. Given the wide variation in costs of care for patients 
with a similar diagnosis, this proxy, even when adjusted for patient 
characteristics and geographic cost differences, will significantly 
overpay for many episodes and severely underpay for the most ex-
pensive ones. The average Medicare payment for an episode of care 
for beneficiaries hospitalized with pneumonia who received post-
acute care, for example, was just over $20,000 in 2006. A payment 
based on this average, however, would be too high for the two-thirds 
of those patients who did not receive post-acute care. For the most 
severely ill pneumonia patients, it could be 20 to 30 percent too low.24
www.nhpf.org
17
I S S U E  B R I E F
NO. 841
Risk-adjustment of payments to account for patient characteristics, 
such as complications or comorbidities, that reflect their severity 
and may predict their resource use is the primary method to help 
ensure payment amounts are appropriate. In the absence of well-
developed risk-adjustment methods, other ways to guard against 
payments that are too high or too low include adjustments that limit 
the entity’s profits or losses for an individual episode or all episodes, 
such as risk corridors or risk sharing. Outlier payments could pro-
tect entities from unexpectedly high costs of certain individuals. 
These methods could mitigate the potential negative consequences 
of a bundled approach until more refined payment adjustments and 
oversight mechanisms are fully developed.
Risk and Other Adjustments—Medicare uses different patient classifica-
tion methods with different underlying data requirements in hospi-
tals and each post-acute care provider type to risk-adjust payments 
(Figure 5). Typically, patients are grouped on the basis of characteris-
tics that are associated with the services they need or their expected 
resource use, and the payment for all patients in the same group are 
adjusted by the same amount. Medicare’s hospital payment system 
PROVIDER TYPE Payment Method Patient Classification
Home Health 
Agency (HHA)
Per 60-day episode HHRGs—home health resource groups, 153 categories based on clinical and functional status and service use
Skilled Nursing 
Facility (SNF)





CMGs —case-mix groups, 100 intensive rehabilitation 
categories based on primary reason for need for rehabilitation, 





MS LTC-DRGs—Medicare severity–long-term care–diagnosis 
related groups based on principle reason for admission, 
complications and comorbidities and severity
Source: Federal Register, vol. 75, no. 221, November 17, 2010, http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-27778.pdf; Federal Register, 
vol. 74, no. 153, August 11, 2009, http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-18662.pdf; Federal Register, vol. 74, no. 86, May 6, 2009, 
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/E9-10078.htm; Federal Register, vol. 75, no. 157, August 16, 2010, http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/
pdf/2010-19092.pdf.
FIGURE 5
Post-Acute Care Providers: Medicare Payment and Classification Systems
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uses the Medicare severity-diagnosis related group (MS-DRG) sys-
tem to group patients based on diagnosis, age, and complicating 
conditions.
The MS-DRG system will likely be used to identify the conditions 
that will be included in the pilot and to risk-adjust the bundled 
payment. The ASPE studies and analyses by MedPAC indicate that 
higher severity patients (as indicated by higher severity MS-DRGs 
during the inpatient stay) are likelier to use post-acute care and have 
higher average post-acute care spending.25 Whether these distinc-
tions are robust enough to use in adjusting a bundled payment is 
not clear. There is little reason to believe, however, that any of the 
existing risk adjustment methods used in post-acute care settings 
would improve the adjustment for an episode payment.26 In fact, the 
risk adjustment systems for SNFs and HHAs in particular have been 
criticized because they incorporate service use as a measure of se-
verity. This means that the payment is increased for patients who 
receive more therapy services, which provides incentives for these 
providers to deliver more services. The SNF and home health risk 
adjusters have driven up the provision of therapy services and the 
resulting payments, even though there is no evidence that the pa-
tients need or are benefiting from the extra therapy.27
CMS is testing the CARE instrument in various post-acute settings 
to determine if it is adequate for collecting consistent patient as-
sessment information across post-acute settings. It includes infor-
mation on medical, functional, cognitive impairments, and social/
environmental factors that either measure severity differences with-
in medical conditions or predict outcomes. Consistent data across 
all of the settings could go a long way toward the development of 
adequate risk adjustment methods. Although these are the types of 
factors that might be needed to supplement the MS-DRGs, under-
standing the relationship between these factors, episode costs, and 
episode outcomes will require considerable analysis and lead time.
In addition to helping to ensure that payments are appropriate, cat-
egorizing patients according to their expected costs is critical for ac-
curately comparing the performance of the entities that receive the 
bundled payment.28 Without this type of risk adjustment, one entity 
may appear to have lower costs and better outcomes merely because 
of the mix of patients it treated. Performance comparisons are im-
portant for the entities as they set up their network of providers, 
to payers who want to assess whether they are receiving value for 
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their payments, and for patients and providers as they make treat-
ment choices. The factors used in risk adjustment for payment and 
for measuring performance are likely to differ and be based on dif-
ferent data.29
Other Payment Adjustments—Other adjustments may be incorporated 
into the bundled payment system. Medicare makes geographic ad-
justments in all of its payment systems to account for area differ-
ences in wages. Medicare also adjusts payments in some situations 
to account for extra costs associated with operating in a rural area, 
for example, or an inner city area, when it wants to ensure appropri-
ate patient access. Analyses would be needed to determine if, for ex-
ample, there are systematic differences in costs between post-acute 
care episodes provided in rural versus urban areas, or the contribu-
tion of wage differences to episode costs. Medicare may also need to 
consider the maldistribution of certain post-acute care providers in 
making geographic adjustments to episode payments.
Quality Assessment and Oversight
Medicare collects a significant number of provider-specific perfor-
mance measures at each site of care. Many of these measures, how-
ever, are of discrete services rather than the full spectrum of servic-
es across an episode, and they provide little opportunity to assess 
joint accountability for care delivered during an episode.30 Much 
like the separate classification and risk adjustment systems across 
providers, how and whether the performance measures can be com-
bined to adequately assess an episode is not known.31 One analysis 
of episode payment options concluded, “The separate performance 
measurement and payment systems for each provider type and set-
ting are not aligned around or reflective of the continuum of care 
that a beneficiary receives within a given course of treatment or epi-
sode of care.”32
Incorporating ongoing oversight mechanisms into the design of a 
bundled payment approach will also be critical. The vulnerability 
of patients to underservice or poor care increases with the size and 
extent of an inclusive payment approach. The larger the bundle, the 
greater the ability of providers to make large sums of money by stint-
ing on care, particularly if the patient classification system does not 
adequately distinguish among patients based on their level of need. 
Without a policy design that ensures that care for certain types of 
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patients is not more profitable than care for other types of patients, 
the less profitable patients may not have adequate access. Protect-
ing from these potential problems requires continued, and possibly 
expanded, reporting and evaluation of service-level data across the 
entire episode. The total number of minutes of therapy, for example, 
or patient functional status may need to be collected consistently 
across sites to monitor the level of care patients are receiving and 
to correlate care with outcomes. Lack of adequate planning for data 
requirements and oversight would hamper efforts to refine and im-
prove the bundled payment approach, while leaving beneficiaries 
vulnerable to high costs and inadequate care.
CONCLUSION
Medicare has implemented bundled payment methods for hospital 
admissions, physician surgical services, dialysis treatments, and 
other services, but the bundling option contemplated under PPACA 
is the first to extend beyond individual sites and providers. Many be-
lieve that if providers have the financial incentives to coordinate and 
manage care as they would under a bundled payment, they would 
focus on improving the efficiency of care through better coordina-
tion of services over time and across settings. They would need to 
improve information exchange, which in turn could improve quality 
of care. Rather than delineating the ways to achieve this, a bundled 
payment turns over the responsibility for developing these improve-
ments to an entity in exchange for financial rewards in meeting 
these objectives. But the payment method may also reward inade-
quate care or patient selection without certain safeguards. The entity 
that receives the payment needs to have the clinical expertise and 
range of provider capability to be able to ensure that patients receive 
appropriate care. The bundle of services needs to be adequately de-
fined to ensure that patient care standards are met, that services are 
not delayed so they are covered under another payment, and to fa-
cilitate monitoring. The payment and adjustments need to be appro-
priate to reward entities for coordinating and managing the care of 
patients, ensure patient access, and achieve efficiencies for the payer. 
The performance of the providers should be adequately assessed 
and monitored in a timely manner so that any problems can be ad-
dressed quickly. Although options for constraining the financial risk 
to entities for accepting a bundled payment also limit their ability to 
experiment with alternative models of care, given the potential for 
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unintended consequences of the bundled payments, such risk miti-
gation may be needed for Medicare to maintain its responsibility to 
its beneficiaries and program spending.
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